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prefect in the late 80s.64 So, during Domitian s absences from Rome
supervising operations against the Dacians, two of the three city
prefects probably representing him in Rome had had considerable
experience on the Danube. His courtiers expertise lay mostly here.
Of the three actual (or potential) opponents Suebi, Dacians and
Sarmatians the latter were by far the most formidable. In general,
the Suebian Marcomanni and Quadi were unreliable Roman clients,
 likelier to be loyal to Rome than to take orders from others (Hist.
3.5): the reference is to the civil war period, when one of their kings
was Italus (PIR2 I 60), father (so it seems) of Chariomerus (C 714),
who sought Domitian s help (c. 90 1) against the Chatti, sending
him hostages and receiving money in return but no soldiers (Dio
67.5.1). More dangerous were the Dacians, long weakened after the
downfall of Burebista but soon to regain prominence under
Decebalus:65 they too were Roman clients and about as reliable as
the Suebi. But the Sarmatians posed more serious problems. As early
as the fifth century BC, Herodotus (4.21.110 17) had been aware of
the Indo-European Sauromatae (or Sarmatae) who, for centuries,
controlled the area from the Hungarian plain to the lower Volga. At
various periods, both groups of Sarmatians, western (Iazyges and
Roxolani) and eastern (Alani) represented an actual menace as they
moved westwards, and remained so until finally dispersed by the
Huns.66
The official attitude to them in the civil war is significant: whereas
the Suebi did provide some assistance (Hist. 3.5), the Flavian generals
would not use the Iazyges in a force against Vitellius for fear that
they would immediately desert on receiving a better offer (Hist. 3.5).
As well, at this very period, occurred the first recorded contact
between Rome and the Roxolani.67 With the passage of time, the
situation became more critical as Sarmatian pressure westward
increased, forcing Rome to reassess its relationship with the Dacians
and Suebi. The most efficient (i.e. cheapest) solution would have
been the development of a secure client-king system, supported by
generous subsidies. Annexation was both dangerous and expensive,
and all the more so since Rome would have to provide garrisons
large enough to control not only the Suebi and Dacians but also
both the Iazyges to the west and the Roxolani to the east.68
Recent archaeological investigation has revealed that Vespasian
consistently strengthened the Danubian defences.69 It seems70 that
Vespasian did not increase the total military establishment there but
rather redeployed it, adopting different tactics by relying more on
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WAR I
infantry than on cavalry and by concentrating his forces close to the
river, more or less along the lines adopted by Rubrius Gallus (BJ
7.94 5). In the 70s, new work was undertaken at the legionary (XV
Apollinaris) base at Carnuntum (CIL 3.11194 7) and at the
auxiliary fort at Aquincum (where the Danube could be forded)
directly opposite the area occupied by the Iazyges. A whole series of
forts at Hurlec, Leskovec, Nikopol, Donji Milanovac, Orehovo (AE
1957:307: AD 76) and Adony, long thought to have been
Domitianic, are now known to have been undertaken by Vespasian.71
Again, this substantial increase in fort construction must have placed
additional pressure on the Danubian fleet, so the naval bases at
Zemun (Pannonia), Noviodunum (Moesia) and possibly those at
Arcar (Ratiaria) and Sexaginta Prista (Ruse) may well have been
due to Vespasian s initiative.72 The Romans did have ships on the
Danube in the first half of the century, but now both the Pannonian
and Moesian fleets were named Flavia, possibly due to Domitian s
initiative. He seems to have added to the personnel and increased
the status of the officers: particularly significant in this regard is the
cursus (AE 1972:572) of M.Arruntius Claudianus from Ephesus, one
of the emperor s senior equestrian officials (praefectus classis
Moesiacae et ripae Danuvi73) to whom he subsequently granted
senatorial rank. Finally, as the shortest route from Italy to the Lower
Danube was via the river Save, it is hardly surprising that Vespasian
established colonies at either end of the river, at Siscia and Sirmium.74
From the start, Domitian persisted with his father s policy of
strengthening the Danubian defences and especially the river
crossings. Auxiliary units were sent to Pannonia in the early 80s, as
is indicated by a comparison of three Pannonian diplomas, viz. CIL
16.26 of 13 June 80 (with four alae and thirteen cohortes), CIL
16.30 of 3 September 84 (with five alae and thirteen cohortes) and
CIL 16.31 of 5 September 85 (with six and fifteen respectively); as
well, the ala Claudia nova, cohors III Gallorum and cohors V
Hispanorum had arrived in Moesia from their German bases by 20
September 82 (CIL 16.28=ILS 1995). Not too much should be made
of this, however, as the legionary complement in the Danubian area
was still as it had been almost twenty years before, late in Nero s
reign, when there had been two legions in Pannonia (XV Apollinaris
at Carnuntum and XIII Gemina at Poetovio), one in Dalmatia (XI
Claudia at Burnum) and three in Moesia (VII Claudia at
Viminacium, III Gallica at [possibly] Oescus and VIII Augusta at
Novae): by 81, though, the V Macedonica had replaced the III
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Gallica at Oescus, IV Flavia was at Burnum and I Italica at Novae.75
Domitian s Danubian experts looked towards a continuation of
Vespasian s policy of fortifying the river-bank area and developing
stronger client-king relationships with the Suebi and Dacians. But
Domitian, eager for military glory, and having quickly claimed a
probably undeserved triumph in Germany, may have favoured or
have been suspected of favouring direct intervention. On the other
hand, the recently united and strengthened Dacian tribes may have
been under pressure from outside. Whatever the truth, the Dacians
acted.
FIRST DACIAN WAR, 84/576
In the winter (Pan. 12.3 5) of 84/5,77 the Dacians, possibly under
the leadership of Diurpaneus (or Dorpaneus),78 crossed over the
Danube and attacked the Romans, killing the Moesian governor
Oppius Sabinus (PIR2 O 122) and wreaking considerable
destruction: some claim that the legion V Alaudae perished then too.
But Suetonius makes no reference to the loss of a legion at that time,
though a few lines lower (Dom. 6.1) he notes the destruction of one
(?XXI Rapax) by the Sarmatians. The lost standard (semeion)
referred to by Dio (68.9.3) probably belonged to the praetorian
guard, not to a legion, and was lost by Cornelius Fuscus.79 Oppius [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]